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Abstract:  The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union has been in a 
process of reform since the early 1990s. As a result of reforms, agricultural market 
regulations have become more liberal and direct payments have been introduced which are 
to a large extent decoupled from production. In this paper, we analyze the effects of the 
direct payments to farmers on inequality of profits in German agriculture. For this purpose, 
we decompose measures of absolute and relative inequality in total farm profits into the 
partial effects of the direct payments and all other profit determinants. Key results of the 
analysis are that the system of direct payments under the New CAP accounts for about one 
third of the observed inequality in family farms and for almost two thirds of inequality in the 
large incorporated farms. 
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Since the early 1990s, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union 
has been in the process of reform. In this process, the traditional farm subsidies in the 
form of variable import levies, export subsidies and other government market 
interventions increasingly have been replaced by direct payments to farmers which are 
to a large extent decoupled from actual production.  
 
One key argument against the traditional CAP, which attempted to provide income 
support to farmers, has been that this type of policy is poorly suited to realizing this 
objective because of detrimental distributive effects (e.g. von Witzke, 1979; von Witzke 
and Schmitt, 1981). Under the traditional CAP, price support transfers from the EU to 
farmers were linked to production. Thus, large operations, which produced a lot and 
which typically secured high incomes, were the primary beneficiaries and not the small 
farmers for whom this policy was intended. Moreover, it is the land owners rather than 
the operators who reap most of the benefits of this type of policy, as agricultural 
producer price support tends to be capitalized to a large extent into farm land prices. 
 
The  New CAP lacks the explicit agricultural income support objective. Rather it is 
politically legitimized as compensation for positive externalities and the provision of 
public goods. Whatever public goods and positive externalities farmers might produce, 
they will be tied directly or indirectly to the size of the operation. However, it is false to 
conclude that the distributive effects of farm payments under the New CAP do not 
matter. 
 
Allocation and distribution are two key economic dimensions. Allocative and distributive 
effects are central variables by which the performance of government policies is 
measured. Therefore, it is not all that surprising that the distributive implications of 
agricultural and trade policies in EU countries (e.g. von Witzke, 1983; 1984; Kleinhanss, 
2004; Thurston, 2006), the United States (e.g. MacDonald, 2006) and elsewhere have 
been subject to scientific scrutiny and public debate. The European Union has 
apparently already felt the public unease with the distribution of farm payments under 
the New CAP, as the EU Commission has repeatedly expressed concern in this regard 
and contemplated imposing limitations on individual payments to farmers. 
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At first glance, it might appear paradoxical that the traditional CAP, which had an 
explicit distributive objective, was politically acceptable for the last four decades despite 
its inability to meet this objective with reasonable efficiency, and that the distributive 
consequences of the New CAP, which lacks an explicit distributive motivation, has 
become cause for political concern. This paradoxical political attitude can be resolved, 
however, when one takes into account that the distributive effects of the traditional CAP 
have not been transparent to the public because the transfers to farmers were 
disguised as support prices. Under the New CAP the magnitude of transfers to the farm 
economy is much more conspicuous even to the casual observer of the CAP. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we will, first, present a theoretical framework which is 
suitable for the decomposition of two commonly used measures of absolute and 
relative inequality into the partial contribution of inequality determining variables. Then, 
we will present the results of an empirical analysis of the contribution to inequality of 
the direct payments to farmers in Germany under the New Common Agricultural Policy 
of the European Union. As the European Commission is again contemplating imposing 
limitations of payments to individual farms, we will also quantify how a payment cap at 
€ 300,000 per farm would affect profit levels and inequality. We will conclude with the 




2. Theoretical  framework 
2.1  The measurement of inequality 
Inequality has many dimensions (e.g. Sen, 1973; von Witzke, 1983). Two of them are 
considered here. They are absolute and relative inequality. 
 
A commonly used measure of average relative inequality of a distribution is the Gini 
coefficient  (G). When the observations (y) are arranged in a monotonically non-
decreasing order G may be defined as follows: 
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Notice that   in eq. (3) represents the slope of the Lorenz curve in i.  i r
 
G has a number of nice and intuitively appealing properties. 
•  It is constant with respect to a proportional change of all observations. 
•  It is invariant to sample size. 
•  It meets the transfer axiom (a transfer from one unit of observation to a larger one 
acts to increase G). 
•  For non-negative values it is in the interval [0,1], where 0 reflects perfect equality 
and 1 perfect inequality. 
 
 
When G is multiplied by  μ ⋅ 2  (µ = arithmetic mean), one obtains a measure of average 












GA is characterized by properties which are analogous to G: 
 
•  It is invariant to a change in value of the observations which is identical for all 
observations. 
•  It is invariant to sample size. 
•  It meets the transfer axiom.  
•  For non negative values it is in the interval [0,1). 
 
2.2  Decomposing inequality  
In this paper, we wish to determine the extent of overall profit inequality in German 
agriculture and the contribution of the distribution of direct payments to overall 
inequality of profits. For this purpose, the two measures of inequality discussed above 
will be decomposed. This allows us to quantify the contribution of the inequality of profit 
components to overall profit inequality.
1
 
Assume that total profit (  is the sum of two components  ) y (x and  . Then for any 
individual farm 
) z
( ) i . 
 
(5)    i i i z x y + =
 
When the profit vector (y) is arranged in a monotonically non-decreasing order, and the 
income components are arranged according to  , then G , as defined in eq. (1), can  i y
                                                 
1   The following decomposition analysis is based on Rao (1969), Fei et al. (1978), Pyatt et al. (1980), 
Shorrocks (1982), von Witzke (1983, 1984). 
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be decomposed into the contribution of the distribution of profit components to overall 
inequality. This can easily be seen as: 
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The two parts of the right hand side of eq. (8) formally look like Gini coefficients of the 
two profit components. However, they are not true Gini coefficients, as they are not 
necessarily arranged in a monotonically non-decreasing order and, therefore, can 
assume values outside [0,1]. We will refer to them as partial pseudo Gini coefficients 
. Thus, we obtain:  ( PPG)
 
(9)    z x PPG PPG G + =
 
The   are the product of the relative contribution of the  i PPG th i−  profit determinant to 
total profit (  and the distribution of the  ) i w th i−  profit determinant. This can easily be 
seen by rewriting eq. (6) as follows: 
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Two expressions on the right side of eq. (10)   formally look like 
Gini-coefficients of the income determining variables x and z respectively. However, 

















i r and r l
1 1
xxi and rzzi are not necessarily arranged in a 
monotonically non-decreasing order. In the literature, they are often referred to as 
pseudo factor Gini coefficients (PFG). Therefore, eq. (10) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
(15)    y y x x PFG w PFG w G ⋅ + ⋅ =
 
By analogy, GA can be decomposed: 
 












GA ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ = ∑ ∑




When there are negative profits G may be outside [0,1]. When average profits are 





















The existence of negative profits may complicate the interpretation of results 
significantly (Amiel, et al., 1996; Allanson, 2006). As will become evident later, negative 
profits do occur in both farm groups analyzed here. Their impact on the results for 
family farms is limited. However, negative profits are of significance in the incorporated 
farms. In fact, average profit without the direct payments is negative in the incorporated 
farms.  
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3. Empirical  analysis 
3.1 Data 
The data used in this analysis has been made available by the German Federal 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection. It is the very same data set 
upon which the annual report on the economic situation of German agriculture is based 
(“Testbetriebe”) and which is reported to the EU farm data network (FADN). A total of 
11,756 observations are available for 2005 for farms with a single operator and 
partnerships of (usually) four or fewer partners. They represent more than 250,000 
farms. In the remainder of this paper these farms will be referred to as ‘family farms’. In 
addition, there is data available for 2004/05 for 481 large incorporated farms, typically 
located in the East of Germany. They represent a population of 2,876 farms. The two 
samples can be considered to be reasonably representative of German farms. The 
data is grouped by agricultural accounting profit per farm before taxes. We have opted 
to analyze both samples separately because they cover different time periods and 
because the definition of accounting profit is somewhat different between the two farm 
types.  
 
The cash transfers to farmers considered in this analysis include all direct payments. 
The bulk of these payments are (largely) decoupled transfers under the New CAP. 
They are based on historic production figures. The calculation of the actual individual 
transfers is rather complicated and cannot be discussed here (for details see BMVEL, 
2005). In essence, the sum of total payments can be expected to correlate with farm 
size. Therefore, we expect large operations to receive more in payments from the 
government than do small farms. 
 
Individual data has not been available due to government data privacy regulations. In 
fact, only averages are available for each group. The farm profit classes according to 
which the data is grouped are exhibited in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
 
3.2  Direct payment and farm size 
The individual payments for which farmers are eligible require complex calculations 
and detailed information on each individual farm. In fact, the calculations are very 
complex and the administrative cost for the calculation of individual payments and 
verifying the information provided by farmers is high as well. Therefore, it is sometimes 
argued that payments to small farms should be discontinued altogether. 
 
However, the payments are in one way or another related to farm size, as are farm 
profits. As this is the case, one would expect the direct payments to contribute to profit 
inequality. Therefore, one or more variables which capture farm size might be good 
predictors of total direct payments received by farmers. One variable often used to 
capture farm size is the area farmed. We found that this variable is indeed an excellent 
predictor of the direct payments received by a farm. We ran WLS regressions with total 
direct payments per farm within in each profit class as the dependent variable and area 
used for farming as the independent variable where the number of observations per   Agricultural and Trade Policy Reform and Inequality  7 
profit class determines the weight of each observation. The results are presented in 
table 1. 
 
Table 1:   Explaining direct payments received per farm acreage farmed  
(WLS regression) 
1.1  Results of the WLS regression analysis for family farms (2005) 
dependent variable  total direct payments per farm (€) 
independent variable  agricultural area per farm (€) 
intercept 
1 1250.021     (2.509) 
slope 
1 372.946 (112.336) 
adjusted R²  .999
F 12619.378
 
1.2  Results of the WLS regression analysis for incorporated farms (2004/05) 
dependent variable  total direct payments per farm (€) 
independent variable  agricultural area per farm (€) 
intercept 
1 6971.894     (.200) 
slope 
1 404.815 (16.782) 
adjusted R²  .949
F 281.644
1    t-values in parenthesis  
Source: Own calculations based on BMELV. 
 
It becomes obvious from table 1 that the area farmed is an excellent predictor of the 
total amount of direct payments received per farm. For both family farms and for the 
large incorporated farms the estimates have an excellent fit and the t-values are highly 
significant. 
 
A word of caution is in order, however. The estimates are based on grouped data. They 
reflect group averages. Thus, it is possible that some individual farm characteristics 
may lead to somewhat higher or lower actual individual payments than one would 
expect based on the estimates presented here. 
 
3.3  The contribution of the inequality of the direct payments to overall profit 
inequality 
 
The extent of relative and absolute inequality is exhibited in table 2. In order to 
demonstrate the effect of negative profits on overall inequality, we have calculated G 
and GA in two ways, setting negative profits equal to one and accounting fully for 
negative profits. 
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In general, G is fairly high. This is, however, not very surprising when annual data is 
used in the calculations, as profits tend to fluctuate considerably from one year to the 
next due to random events such as weather, plant or animal disease. 
 
In the incorporated farms inequality is more pronounced than in the family farms. This 
is particularly true with regard to GA. In part, this reflects the fact that the incorporated 
farms are larger and thus receive more subsidies and secure higher profits. 
 
Table 2:   Average relative and absolute inequality in German farms, 2005 
(family farms), 2004/05 incorporated farms 
2.1: Negative profits = 0 
farm type  G  GA (€) 
family farms                    .50271                  40,313 
incorporated farms                    .64853                134,432 
 
2.2 Negative profits accounted for 
Farm type  G  GA (€) 
Family farms                    .53558                  41,970 
Incorporated farms                    .85089                154,707 
Source: Own calculation based on BMELV. 
 
A comparison of the results in tables 2.1 and 2.2 shows that the impact of negative 
profits in inequality is fairly limited in the family farms but rather pronounced in the 
incorporated farms. The main reason for this is that in the family farms the percentage 
of farms with negative profits is about half of what it is in the incorporated farms. 
 
In the decomposition of overall inequality into its partial effects we have fully accounted 
for negative profits, as this yields exact results. We have calculated the numbers for total 
profit including direct payments, direct payments only, and profit without direct 
payments. In the remainder of this paper we will refer to profit without direct payments 
as ‘market profit’. Notice that market profit is not identical to free market profit, as 
market profit also contains subsidies to farmers through government market 
interventions such as trade restrictions, domestic minimum prices, domestic production 
quotas and other policy instruments. 
 
The results of the decomposition analysis are quite dramatic. In the family farms the 
direct payments account for about one third of total inequality while in the incorporated 
farms they account for almost two thirds of total inequality.  
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Table 3:   Inequality of farm profits, direct payments, and market profits in 
German farms, 2005 (family farms) and 2004/05 (incorporated farms); 
negative profits accounted for 
3.1 Relative inequality 
farm type  Gini coefficient PPG direct payments  PPG market profits 
family farms  .53558  .17554  .36004 
Incorporated farms  .85089  .53645  .31444 
 
3.2 Absolute inequality (€) 
farm type  GA  PPGA dir. payments  PPGA mkt. profits 
family farms         41,970               13,756           28,214 
incorporated farms       151,707               97,536           54,171 
Source: Own calculations based on BMELV. 
 
Notice that the results reported in table 3 underestimate the actual contribution of direct 
payments to overall inequality. The reason is that the inequality of annual market profits 
is subject to random shocks. Therefore, annual profit inequality is larger than inequality 
of average profits for more than one year (von Witzke, 1983). Hence, the inequality of 
market profits would be reduced if these shocks were accounted for. 
 
In contrast to the PPGAs, the PPGs can be decomposed further. The results of the 
decomposition of the PPGs are exhibited in table 4. The interpretation of the numbers 
for the family farms is straightforward. The direct payments account for about 60 per 
cent of total profit. The rest (about 40 per cent) is market profit. The PFG of market 
profit is close to one. This reflects overall inequality but it also reflects the fact that 
almost one third of family farms would realize negative profits in the absence of the 
direct payments. 
 
The interpretation of the results for the incorporated farms is complicated by the fact 
that the market profit in all but one profit class is negative. Therefore, the weight of the 
market profit is negative as is the respective PFG. As the direct payments are the key 
component for overall profit, its weight is rather high. Notice that the sum of both 
weights must be equal to one (see eqs. (11) and (12)).  
 
Table 4:   Decomposition of the Partial Pseudo Gini coefficients (PPG),  
family farms (2005) and incorporated farms (2004/05) 
direct payments  market profit   
farm type  PPG w PFG  PPG w PFG 
family  farms  .17554 .60472 .29028 .36004 .39528 .91085 
incorporated  farms .53645 5.9401 .09031 .31444 -4.9401  -.06365 
Source: Own calculations based on BMVEL. 
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3.4  Implications of payment limitations 
The European Union has repeatedly considered limitations on payments to individual 
farms. Therefore, we have analyzed how such upper limits would affect German 
agriculture at present farm structure. We have analyzed the distributive effects of 
payment limitations in the amount of € 300,000, as this is a payment cap presently 
contemplated by the European Union. The results are presented in table 5. As can be 
seen, a payment limit of € 300,000 would have no effect at all on family farms. Notice 
that very large farms with single ownership or limited number of partners, which here 
are referred to as family farms, are not in the sample. These large operations would, of 
course, also be affected by the payment limitation analyzed here. Notice also that 
payment limitations create an incentive to split up farms into smaller units. 
 
In the incorporated farms, both payment limitations would be binding in every profit 
class except one. The reason is that these farms tend to be large, and thus receive 
large direct payments. Tables 5 and A1 also clearly demonstrate that all incorporated 
farms except those few in the highest profit class would make a loss in the absence of 
the direct payments. Therefore, G becomes negative with payment limitation while GA 
declines by almost two thirds. As the payment limitation is binding for all but one profit 
class, their PPG and PPGA respectively is close to zero, and overall inequality is 
almost entirely accounted for by the inequality of market profits. 
 
Table 5:   The effect of a € 300,000 per farm payment limitation on relative and 
absolute inequality 
5.1 Family farms 
    No effect in family farms. 
 









.85089 -.19505  -.00416  -.19089 
GA without  
limitation 
(€) 









154,707 58,417 1,246  57,171 
Source: Own calculations based on BMELV.   Agricultural and Trade Policy Reform and Inequality  11 
4.  Summary and conclusions 
This paper presents a methodological framework for the analysis of the determinants of 
economic inequality. It is applied here in order to quantify the impact of direct payments 
under the European Union’s New CAP on profit inequality between German farms. 
 
The results demonstrate that the direct payments contribute significantly to profit 
inequality in German agriculture. About one third of observed inequality between family 
farms is accounted for by direct payments, while direct payments account for almost 
two thirds to observed inequality between the large incorporated farms. A typical family 
farm secures a profit of about € 25,000 of which about € 17,000 is accounted for by 
direct payments. The incorporated farms typically receive a multitude of the payments 
made to family farms. Even the smaller incorporated farms receive government 
cheques of more than € 500,000. The larger operations secure direct payments from 
the government in excess of € 1,000,000. However, the vast majority of incorporated 
farms would make negative profits in the absence of direct payments. 
 
The EU has repeatedly considered imposing limitations on direct payments made to an 
individual farm. In this paper, we have calculated the implications of a payment 
limitation per farm in the amount of € 300,000. The results suggest that smaller family 
farms would not be affected by such a payment limitation simply because they typically 
receive payments that do not exceed the limitation considered here. However, the large 
incorporated farms would experience a significant reduction in payments. The vast 
majority of these farms would make negative profits in the absence of the direct 
payments and, therefore, would be forced to go out of business or to restructure and 
become efficient. 
In this context, the issue of equity has to be addressed as well. To a significant degree 
the New CAP has replaced traditional farm subsidies. Much like the traditional farm 
subsidies, the direct payments are closely linked to farm size. Thus, it is not surprising 
that direct payments are rather unequally distributed in favour of large operations. 
Therefore, the New CAP contributes significantly to inequality within agriculture. 
 
The proponents of decoupled payments claim that this type of subsidy has no effect on 
factor allocation and, thus, no effect on social welfare either. This presumption is based 
on a very simple model of neoclassical partial equilibrium analysis in which liquidity 
does not matter for either production or investment decisions, in which risk and risk 
aversion do not exist, in which farmers do not hold expectations about future 
adaptations of agricultural policies, and in which factor payments in agriculture are 
identical to those outside of agriculture. The findings in this paper contradict this 
perception and they are consistent with the US experience of decoupled payments to 
farmers under the 1996 US Farm Bill. 
 
As this is the case, the direct payments keep farms which are inefficient in business. 
Without the subsidies under the EU’s New CAP, society would be better of and social 
welfare would be higher. The structural adjustments would include downsizing the labor 
force and a reduction in the rental price of agricultural land. In the absence of these 
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subsidies, the inefficient farms would go out of business, or they would have to 
restructure to become efficient. Essentially the same is true for payment limitations, 
except that the economic incentives to adjust towards more efficient farms are 
alleviated, and incentives are generated to avoid payment caps by splitting up (existing) 




P. Allanson, “The Redistributive Effects of Agricultural Policy on Scottish Farm Incomes.” J. 
Agr. Econ. 57 (2006): 117-128. 
Y. Amiel, et al., “Inequality among the Kibbutzim.” Economica 63 (1996): S63-S85. 
BMELV (German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection), Selected 
sample farm data, 2004/05 and 2005. 
BMVEL (German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection), 
Meilensteine der Agrarpolitik, 2005. 
J. C. H. Fei et al., “Growth and the Family Distribution of Income”. Q. J. Econ. 92 (1978): 17-
53. 
W. Kleinhanss, “Use of Microdata for Policy Analysis of the CAP”. Paper presented at the 
OECD workshop on Information Needs for the Analysis of Household Income Issues”. 
Paris, 2004. 
J. MacDonald et al., “Growing Farm Size and the Distribution of Farm Payments”. 
USDA/ERS Economic Brief 6, 2006. 
G. Pyatt et al., “The Distribution of Income by Factor Component”. Q. J. Econ. 95 (1980): 
451-473. 
V. M. Rao, “Two Decompositions of Concentration Ratio”. J. Royal Stat. Soc. 132 (1969): 
418-425.  
A. F. Shorrocks, “Inequality Decomposition by Factor Components”. Econometrica 50 
(1982):  193-211. 
A. K. Sen, On Economic Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973. 
J. Thurston, “Capping the CAP: The Effect of Payment Limitations on EU Farm Subsidies”. 
www.farmsubsidy.org , June 2006.  
H. von Witzke, “Prices, Common Agricultural Policy and Personal Distribution of Income in 
West German Agriculture”. Eur. Rev. Agr. Econ. 6 (1979): 61-80. 
H. von Witzke and G. Schmitt, “Minimum Income Policy”. The Rural Challenge, M. A. 
Bellamy and B. L. Greenshields (eds.), Guildford: Gower, 1981. 
H. von Witzke, A Model of Absolute and Relative Income Differences in Agriculture. Kiel: 
Vauk, 1983. 
H. von Witzke, “A Model of Income Distribution in Agriculture: Theory and Evidence”. Eur. 
Rev. Agr. Econ. 11 (1984): 67-85.   Agricultural and Trade Policy Reform and Inequality  13 
Appendix 
 
Table A 1:   Farm profit class, profits and number of observations per profit class 
 






total number of 
farms 
profit per farm 
(€) 
total direct 
payments per farm 
(€) 
≤ 0  1,117  37,659  -9,626  11,397 
0 – 5  672  23,692  2,573  11,179 
5 – 10  724  21,711  7,580  12,636 
10 – 15  842  22,680  12,453  13,944 
15 – 20  910  22,112  17,428  15,539 
20 – 30  1,696  37,193  24,948  17,220 
30 – 40   1,473  27,687  34,581  21,234 
40 – 50   1,058  17,752  44,802  25,830 
50 – 75   1,630  25,651  60,762  31,840 
75 – 100   785  10,890  85,397  37,939 
100 – 125   377  4,827  110,676  47,174 
125 – 150   179  2,294  135,766  47,263 
150 – 200  171  1,907  170,765  74,870 
200 – 300  81  826  237,862  105,844 
> 300  41  453  404,499  150,207 
 
 






total number of 
farms 
profit per farm 
(€) 
total direct 
payments per farm 
(€) 
≤ 0  94  519  -65,162  517,570 
0 – 5  34  202  2,710  416,444 
5 – 10  17  94  7,409  281,623 
10 – 15  16  75  12,766  608,598 
15 – 20  12  104  17,129  358,964 
20 – 30  27  184  24,398  335,200 
30 – 40  23  151  35,152  474,244 
40 – 50  22  118  44,506  623,146 
50 – 75  31  205  61,602  480,161 
75 – 100  37  259  86,326  452,225 
100 – 125  26  141  115,600  682,668 
125 – 150  29  194  139,218  622,194 
150 – 200  37  189  174,345  612,657 
200 – 300  44  265  249,202  585,224 
300 – 500  26  152  368,832  853,600 
> 500  6  24  1,271,034  1,068,592 
Source: BMELV and own calculations based on BMELV. 
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Table A 2:   Farm profit, direct payments and market profit with payment limitations  




total number of 
farms 






new profit per farm 
(with payment 
limitations) (€) 
≤ 0  519  -582,732  300,000  -282,732 
0 – 5  202  -413,734  300,000  -113,734 
5 – 10  94  -274,214  281,623  7,409 
10 – 15  75  -595,832  300,000  -295,832 
15 – 20  104  -341,835  300,000  -41,835 
20 – 30  184  -310,802  300,000  -10,802 
30 – 40   151  -439,092  300,000  -139,092 
40 – 50   118  -578,640  300,000  -278,640 
50 – 75   205  -418,559  300,000  -118,559 
75 – 100   259  -365,899  300,000  -65,899 
100 – 125   141  -567,068  300,000  -267,068 
125 – 150   194  -482,976  300,000  -182,976 
150 – 200  189  -438,312  300,000  -138,312 
200 – 300  265  -336,022  300,000  -36,022 
300 – 500  152  -484,768  300,000  -184,768 
> 500  24  202,442  300,000  502,442 
Source: BMELV and own calculations based on BMELV. 
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